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After years of developments and improvements, Hong Kong has
become one of the world's major financial centres. However,
there have been many uncertainties within the financial
industry. Actually, the Hong Kong Government began to pay
attention to this industry only after the turmoil, such as
bank runs and bankruptcies, during the early 1960's. When
adequate measures were taken, the industry was under control
again and began to grow very rapidly.
Under the legislation that was introduced in the mid-1960's,
there was the establishment of some non-bank financial
institutions. They were later called the Deposit-taking
companies(DTCs). As these Deposit-taking companies grew and
began playing a more important role in Hong Kong's financial
system, the Hong Kong government decided to enact some
legislation to keep the DTCs under control. The government
claimed that this measure would protect the ordinary
depositors. Although the basic objective behind this move
was positive, there turned out to be some negative effects.
There was a DTC crisis in late 1982, and some DTCs were
closed down. Since then, there have been some changes in
the whole DTC sector. This study aims to assess the
relationship of DTCs with the Hong Kong financial system
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION & SCOPE OF STUDY
1.1 Introduction
The Deposit-taking companies represent a distinct group
of financial institutions in Hong Kong. In fact, it is
their unique history of development and turbulent
experience in industry that spur us to study the past,
present and future of the DTCs.
Prior to 1970, the Hong Kong financial sector was
overwhelmingly dominated by the commercial banks.
Since the imposition of the 1965 moratorium on the
issue of new bank license by government, latecomers,
including those foreign banks who wanted to set up
business in Hong Kong, had to take presence in the form
of DTCs in order to operate in the local financial
environment. This is one of the two main factors in
the proliferation of DTCs in the seventies.
The interest rate agreement, which became effective
2
from July 1964, was another catalyst for the
establishment of DTCs. The agreement was introduced in
a bid to curb cut-throat price competition by the
banks, which had once generated a series of bank runs
in the period 1961-1965.0) Since DTCs are not subject
to this restrictive regulation and are free to set
interest rates, many licensed banks set up their
wholly-owned DTC arm to attract deposits by offering
higher rates.
The operation of DTCs was virtually unregulated in the
early seventies. It was not until the collapse of the
stock market in late 1973 and 1974 that widespread
concern about the-_ sour. ness of some smaller DTCs a
rose. The Deposit-taking Companies Ordinance was
eventually introduced on January 9, 1976 in the same
year.
This ordinance was amended in 1981 as the outcry of
bankers got stronger that the effectiveness of interest
rate agreement was eroded by the competitive, free
market interest rates quoted by the DTCs. While it is
generally agreed that the amendment will improve the
soundness of the local financial system, an immediate
aftermath was the 1982 DTC crisis.
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This lose of balance of DTCs was attributable to both
tightening of government control and a substantial fall
of property prices. As a result, a large number of
mismanaged and financially weak DTCs were sieved.
The survivors of this crisis and of the 1982-83
worldwide economic recession are now fighting hard to
remain competitive in the current market. The battle
in the future is expected to be more thorny than ever
because most banks and DTCs are moving towards
sophistication of services and because of the
realisation by people from all walks of life that the
political future of Hong Kong is uncertain. Hence, we
think tha now is an opportune moment to study the
Dattern of the past, present and future development of
)TCs and evaluate their role in the future Hong Kong
Financial environment.
41.2 Scope of the Study
The objective of our study is to evaluate the role of
DTCs in both the present and future financial structure
of Hong Kong. But prior to the discussion, we will
first of all touch on the financial set-up of the
existing system.
The emphasis of the first half of our paper is on the
financial structure of Hong Kong. Greater weight is
given to the outline of historical development of Hong
Kong's financial structure than to the current
situation. The rationale for this is to provide a
reference framework within which the birth of DTCs can
be located. Thus, the legal environment in which these
financial institutions operate is also given careful
consideration, and government legislation, as well as
related regulatory bodies, will also be included.
The current and future role of DTCs makes up the second
part of our study. In May 1981, the Deposit-taking
Companies Ordinance was amended. This brought forth a
three-tier system in the financial structure of Hong
Kong. The new ordinance came into full effect in June
1983 and was intended to provide the government with
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more control over DTCs as a distinct group of financial
institutions.
Whether or not government has gained greater control
over DTCs than before since the introduction of the new
ordinance, a more immediate aftermath was the so-called
DTC crisis in later 1982- early 1983. Many people
were too quick to blame Hong Kong government for this
disastrous 'collapse' of some DTCs because the crisis
was, in fact, a combined consequence of many economic
forces. Hence, we find it necessary to explore further
the reasons behind this vast catastrophe and see if the
factors were controllable by the DTCs themselves. We
believe a more objective analysis will also throw light
on the underlying problems of the basic financial
structure of Hong Kong.
The last section of this study is on the operation of
DTCs after the 1982-83 crisis. We researched the
successful ways that the surviving DTCs have adopted or
plan to adopt in order to stay and thrive in the
market. Based on findings from our early research, we
hope to get a foresight of the future trend and
development of the DTC industry.
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1.3 limitation of the Study
1. Classification of DTCs
The total number of DTCs in 1984 is about 350.
Bearing in mind that some DTCs are dormant and some
have only a very blurred business scope, we find it
difficult to segment all 350 DTCs into meaningful
sub-groups.
The classification of the DTCs in this study is done
according to the legal classification, which divides
this group of financial institutions into (A)
licensed DTCs and (B) registered DTCs. Although it
seems that licensed DTCs are larger and more
concentrated in merchant banking activities, while
the registered DTCs focused on consumer banking
industries, this is still too much a dubious
classification. In some cases, the registered DTC
is just a nominal company running no business in a
real sense. Other cases, such as what one local
bank has done in establishing three different
registered DTCs that engage in three different lines
of business, are also difficult to identify. Some
of them are created to facilitate paper accounting
that would enlarge the lending ratio of the bank by
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depositing the money around. The task of
classification is made even more difficult by the
fact that the government is not strict in its
regulations that make disclosure of DTC's
information mandatory.
2. The effects from the parent bank
Since some DTCs are wholly-owned subsidiaries of
banks, the banks' overall policy will affect their
affiliated DTC arms to some extent. For example, in
January 1984, Barclays Asia withdrew its status as a
licensed DTC and assimilated its original business
functions into various departments of the mother
bank. It converted its status into a registered DTC
named Barclays Asian Finance Limited. These changes
were due to Barclays Bank's overall policy of
consolidating local and foreign operations.
Therefore, in many cases, we find that the fate of a





In this study, three different methods have been used in
order to obtain information. However, some methods were
more successful than others.
2.1 Library Research
This part mainly provided well-rounded background
information. The paper relied greatly upon this method
of finding out the historical development of Hong
Kong's financial structure and the evolution of
government supervision.
Literature and periodicals about money and banking, and
the financial structure of Hong Kong were studied.
Moreover, first hand resources such as the Amended
Deposit Taking Companies Ordinance and Banking
Ordinance were also included.
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Furthermore, secondary data were obtained from the Hong
Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics printed by the Hong
Kong Government. On the other hand, the Deposit Taking
Registry could provide only a list of all DTCs.
Besides that, the registry charges$ 10 for every
annual report being searched. Due to this financial
constraint, only a few annual reports were reviewed.
Moreover, since Hong Kong Government does not impose
strict regulation upon the DTCs to disclose their
information, the annual reports were not very useful.
2.2 Mailed Questionnaire.
Initially, a set of questionnaires was designed and
sent to the DTCs. However, the response was very poor
and the information obtained did not revealed the
necessary information. Thus, the writers had decided
to drop this part and to concentrate on in-depth
interviews.
2.3 Personal Interviews
Eight interviews were successfully conducted. Each
interview took about one to one and a half hours. The
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questions for discussion are listed in Appendix A.
The discussions were focused on deposit-taking
companies' current role and future direction. Five of
the respondents came from the licensed DTCs. This
posed a limitation on getting comments from registered
DTCs. However, all the respondents were very helpful
and contributed a fair view to the whole DTC industry.
The writers had tried to arrange an interview with the
Commissioner of Banking and DTCs, Mr. Colin Martin.
However, we were unable to get the interview.
Therefore, his views reflected in this paper are not




HONG KONG'S FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND
ITS EFFECT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DTCs
Before any discussion of the current role of DTCs, it is
necessary to review the development of this kind of
financial institutions in Hong Kong. Moreover, it is also
necessary to review the development of the whole financial
system in Hong Kong. This provides the writers with the
measures that can be used to analyse the changes and growth
of these institutions.
3.1 A Brief Account of Hong Kong's Financial Structure.
From the marketing point of view, people may argue that
both the banks and the DTCs share the same market.
DTCs provide a similar range of services to their
customers as the licensed banks do. Competition
between the two is keen. This was reflected in the
complaints made by the DTCs on the issue of interest
12
rate agreement for large amount deposits with
maturation of less than three months. (1) Therefore, it
is necessary to see how the banking sector grew.
3.2 Development of Legislation and the Regulatory Bodies.
Although Hong Kong is famous for its laissez faire
policy, there have been many changes in the regulations
imposed upon the financial sector. And the development
of these regulations did affect the development of the
DTCs. Moreover, in the absence of a central bank,
certain central banking fun-tion- have to be performed
by separate agencies in Hong Kong. This chapter
introduces the basic regulatory bodies in Hong Kong.
1. Development of legislation
In the 1950° s, banking activities were nominally
inder the rule of the Banking Ordinance of 1948.
iowever, this ordinance, due to its extreme
simplicity, provided virtually no effective controls
aver the sector. The main idea of the ordinance was
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that if a bank's business in Hong Kong endangered
the welfare of the public, government may cancel the
bank's license. This simple ordinance was adequate
for the economy at that time when banking was just
financing the entrepot trades.
However, as the economic structures changed in the
following decades, the scope of banking activities
also expanded. Before the 1950's, bank loans were
made mainly to entrepot firms. Once into the
1960's, the demand for loans from the industrial
sector gradually increased. In this period, the
banks also off` red mortgages for the building and
construction sector. After a few bank run
incidents, a new banking ordinance was enacted in
1967. Since then, there have been minor amendments
to the ordinance from time to time.
This legislations rendered quite tight a control on
the bamk's organisation, capital, specified liquid
assets, loan and investment, other business and the
publication of a financial statement. (2) Banking
business is defined as the business of either a). i.
receiving money on current, deposit or other similar
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accounts from the general public, and ii. paying and
collecting cheques drawn by or paid in by customers,
and iii. making advances to customers, or b).
receiving money in savings accounts from the general
public, repayable on demand or within three or at
three month's notice or less or both.
2. Regulatory bodies
1) The Exchange Bank Association and interest
rate agreement
Another important feature in the history of the Hong
Kong financial centre was the establishment of the
Exchange Banks Association and the interest rate
agreement. Before July 1964, banks competed for
deposits by offering higher interest rates. The
interest rate of time deposits may have differed as
high as three percent at that time. To avoid cut
throat competition, major banks arrived at an
interest rate agreement, which was to be
administered by the general committee of the
Exchange Bank Association. The maximum deposit rate
that could be quoted by Banks might vary according
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to the size of the bank, but the maximum deposit
interest rates differentials could be only one
percent. This procedure of setting the rates has
remained basically the same to the present. Besides
the recategorization of banks annually, major
changes on this process happened only recently.
Before June 1972, only the so-called authorized
banks could become members of the Hong Kong Exchange
Bank's Association. The distinction of authorized
banks and non-authorized banks was due to Hong
Kong's being a member of the pound sterling area at
that time and thus being subjected to exchange
controls. The authorized banks were authorized to
deal in the official foreign exchange market and
become full members of the clearing house. While
the non-authorized banks were not under the
restrictions of the foreign exchange controls, and
they were therefore able to engage in foreign
exchange dealings in the free market. However,
since June 1972, Hong Kong was excluded from the
sterling area and is no longer under the exchange
controls. The distinction between authorized and
non-authorized banks has diminished because there
has been no official market since then. From 1972,
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any licensed bank can apply for membership in the
Exchange Bank Association.
?) Hong Kong Association of Banks
In 1981, the Financial Secretary initiated a bill to
rename the Exchange Bank Association as the Hong
Kong Banks Association, and all licensed banks were
obliged to join the Association. and to observe the
rules agreed upon by the Committee. The HKAB
consists of three major bodies- the Committee, the
Consultative Council and the Disciplinary Committee.
a). The Committee
The committee has three permanent members-
HSBC, the Chartered Bank and the Bank of China.,
and nine elected members. Of the nine elected
members, four come from the locally incorporated
banks against five to be elected among the
f oreian incorporated members.
The committee has the power to make rules under
the area of:-




in respect of HK$ denominated deposits
and specified instruments i.e. the interest
rate agreement
ii. the conduct of foreign exchange business
and the setting of brokerage and minimum
commissions in lieu of exchange
iii. the setting of minimum charges/commissions
for securities and safe custody business,
insurance of guarantee or other banking
service and
iv. prohibiting members from transacting
any specified type of business or using any
particular type.
b). The Consultative Council
The Consultative Council of the HKAB is to
advise the Committee on any matter relating to
the business of banking, and to give all members
a forum to discuss matters on policy-making.
The Consultative Council is made up of three
continuing members and twenty elected members.
The elected members of the Council are required
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by statute to be geographically representative.
The elected members of the Council shall be
elected at each annual general meeting.
c). Disciplinary Committee
It is consists of four members- two continuing
members, one locally incorporated bank and one
foreign incorporated bank. The major objective
of this committee is to ensure that the fellow
members are operating under the rules set by the
Committee. In May 1982, an amendment was
introduced to the HKAB to appoint a proxy to
attend any meeting of the HKAB Committee or
sub-committee.
d). Interest Rate Agreement
In accordance with the HKAB Ordinance, a set of
rules was made by the Committee to regulate the
maximum rates of interest, discount and other
benefits that are made to deposits denominated
in Hong Kong dollars in respect to demand
deposits, savings deposits, deposits fixed for a
period, time deposits at call or notice against
the issue of a Certificate of Deposit,
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promissory notes, bills of exchange not related
to a trade transaction, or any financial
instruments. Foreign currency denominated
deposits are not governed by the rate ceilings.
3) Government's Bank, note-issuing and lender
of last resort
These functions are handled by Hong Kong Bank
and Chartered Bank. The Hong Kong Bank, in
addition, administers the clearing house and
keeps a considerable amount of cash reserves of
other banks.
4) Supervision and control
This function is handled by the Commissioner of
Banking, who is also the Commissioner of
Deposit=taking Companies. There are two
statutory bodies-- the Banking Advisory
Committee to advise the Governor on matters
relating to the two Ordinances. Both are
chaired by the Financial Secretary with the
Banking Commissioner as an ex-officio member.
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The system of prudential supervision is based or
a confidential monthly report to the
Commissioner by each bank and DTC. The report
consists of the assets and liabilities of each
bank's office and branches in Hong Kong at the
end of each month and its liquid assets at the
close of each Wednesday. The commissioner will
question the banks or DTCs when necessary to
ensure they are operating prudently within the
code of behaviour laid down in the Ordinance.
Field audits are carried out by banking
examiners, who inspect individual banks every
eighteen months. These audits focus on the
internal control system, accounting policies,
structure and organisation of the individual
banks.
5) Monetary management
The functions of controlling money and credit,
the management of currency issue and foreign
exchange reserves, and the stabilization of
exchange rates are the responsibility of the
Secretary of Monetary Affairs.
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The Banking Commissioner and the Secretary of
Monetary Affairs are responsible to the
Financial Secretary, who keeps close touch with
the two note-issung banks and the interest rate
policy.
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3.3 The Birth of DTCs
1. Developmental stage(1965-1970)
Because of the stringent asset and capital
requirements for a licensed bank and the moratorium
on the granting of bank license since 1965, a new
kind of financial institution began to flourish in
recent years. The term finance companies was used
to cover a large sector of financial institutions
with diversified activities.
As pointed out by many authors, the growth of DTCs
was associated with the growth of Hong Kong as a
major financial centre. Since 1969, the role of
Hong Kong as a major international financial centre
had become obvious. One of the major indication was
its loan and advancements abroad, which grew from
HK$ 204 millions in 1969 to HK$ 40,053 millions in
1982 plus another amount of HK$ 6,395 millions where
the place of use was not known. With this kind of
phenomenal growth, the financial structure was under
a process of transforamtion. Besides the trend
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towards greater banking concentration, there was
also the emergence of a depository financial
institution other than the licensed commercial
banks.
2. The booming age(1972-1981)
Before 1970, the commercial banks were overwhelmingly
dominant. All the other financial intermediaries werE
playing only a marginal role. However, in 1970, a
couple of merchant banks burst upon the scene and were
soon followed by a host of similar institutions,
ranging from branches or subsidiaries of multinational
giants to small local finance companies. The
portmanteau title of "deposit taking companies" has
been given by regulatory authorities to all these
Lnstitutions. According to the DTC Registry
Statistics, there were 348 DTCs operating in Hong Kong
it the beginning of 1984 with 502 offices. (3)
1) Their nature
The proliferation of DTCs was generally considered
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as a response to the booming stock market in the
1972-1973 period. Within the class of DTCs, there
was variation in their capital size,
trustworthiness, source of funds, business they were
involved in, and their relation with the licensed
banks and other financial institutions. One group
of the DTCs have a function similar to that of a
merchant bank. These are usually finance companies
with a relatively large capital base and an
affiliation with a licensed bank or large financial
group (both local and foreign). Their activities
include the underwriting of new issues, corporate
finance, personal loans, mortgage financing, and
money and foreign exchange brokerage. However,
different DTCs may differ in their emphasis on
special fields. The other group of DTCs was of
relatively smaller capital base. Their major
business concentrated on getting deposits from the
public and financing the stock market or real estate
market transactions. The number of this type of
finance company grew the fastest after the abrupt
decline of the stock market in 1973, possibly due to
the increase in demand for money to repay the debts
from speculation loss.
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Z) The impact of legislation reforms
Before the introduction of the DTC Ordinance in
1976, neither group of finance companies was
regulated. The Ordinance was meant to protect the
rights of the depositors. All deposit taking
institutions other than the licensed banks are
required to register with the Commissioner of
banking. But before the introduction of the Amended
DTC Ordinance in 1981., which had structured out a
three-tier system, the only difference between the
commercial banks and the DTCs was that DTCs were not
allowed to operate chequeing accounts and savings
deposits of less than HK$ 50,000 from any individual
depositor. They were also not permitted to use the
word "bank" in their titles.
Apart from these limitations, they were free to
transact every conceivable wholesale banking
business. However'. some functional specialization
could already be detected. Broadly speaking, the
large merchant banks tend to specialize in loan
syndication, foreign exchange and money market
operations, underwriting new issues, corporate and
project finance, and investment managements The
smaller local finance companies, on the other hand,
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lacking capital resources, professional expertise
and international connections, tend to specialize in
the local stock market, property and personal loans.
However, since January 1980, more regulations have
been imposed. DTCs were required to maintain
minimum liquidity (4). And in April 1981, the
Financial Secretary had introduced a new bill
concerning the three-tier financial reform. The
major reason for the creation of a three tier system
was to give the government greater control over the
interest rate. The system came into full effect on
July 1, 1983.
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3) Regulatory controls of DTCs
a). Licensed Deposit taking companies
Main office- HK$100, 000.00Annual
- HK$ 5,000.00Licence Fee Branch
Business- A licensed DTC will be entitled to
Description receive money on deposits account
repayable within less than 3 months
or at call or notice of less than
3 months.
- A licensed DTC is banned from
receiving money on savings and
checking accounts. The minimum
amount of deposits which may
be accepted is to be controlled
Capital- A minimum issued share capital of
requirement HK$100 million
- A minimum paid up share capital
of HK$ 75 million
28
Reserve - A licensed DTC is required
requirements to appropriate at least 1/3
of their declared profits of
each year to a published reserve
until the aggregate of the paid
up share capital and published
reserve amounts to HK$ 150 millions
(amended, see below). This amount
should remain unchanged even of ter
the distribution of extraordinary
profits.
There are other criteria affecting the Financial Secretary's
discretion to grant a Pcens to a registered DTC. These
criteria include the following:-
That the company should have substantial assets (net of
contra item) on its books in Hong Kong with a record of
steady growth and prudent trading for at least three years.
That the company is in reputable ownership (and that the
beneficial owner of any holding or 10% or more of the voting
share capital is identifiable and reputable).
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Recent Amendments (August 5, 1983, the date on which
the Deposit-taking Companies
(Amendment) Bill was gazetted)
No deposit-taking company shall pay any dividend out of the
profits of a previous year unless the aggregate of the
companies paid up share capital and reserves after such
payment will be not less than HK$ 150 millions.
The Commissioner, in the interest of the depositors of the
DTC can exercise his powers to:
- prohibit the DTC from granting any advances, loans or
credit facilities to any overseas banks and
- demand the repayment of money held at call, demand or
notice by the DTC in accordance with terms upon which
they are held.
The licensed DTCs are subject to certain limitations in
respect of their unsecured loans and advances to their
directors, employees and a single customer. These
limitations match closely with those applied to licensed
banks.
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b). Registered deposit-taking companies
Annual Main Office-- HK$ 30, 000.0(
License Fee Branc - HK$ 5,000.00
Business A registered DTC is permitted to
description take or hold any deposits with an
original term to maturity of not
less than 3 months.
- A registered DTC is banned from
receiving money on savings and
checking accounts. The minimum
amount of deposits which may ,)e
accepted is to be controlled.
Capital A minimum paid up share capital of
requirement HK$ 10 millions
Reserve A registered DTC is required to
requirement appropriate at least 1/3 of their
declared profits of each year to a
published reserve until the
aggregate of the paid up share
capital and published reserves
amounts to HK$ 20 million.
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This amount should remained
unchanged even after the
distribution of extraordinary
profits (amended see below).
Recent (August 5, 1983, the date on which the
Amendments DTC (Amendment) Bill was gazetted)
No deposit-taking company shall pay any dividend out of a
previous year unless the aggregate of the company's paid-up
share capital and reserves after such payment will be not
less than HK$ 20 million.
A registered DTC shall not rant' my following facilities to
any director of the DTC, his related persons or companies:
-the granting, or permitting to be outstanding, of
advances, loans or
credit facilities including irrevocable documentary
letters of credit;
-the giving of financial guarantees and
-the incurring of any other liability.
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the aggregate value of share capital acquired or held and
interests in land purchased or held shall riot exceed the
aggregate amount of its paid up capital.
After the reforms in the legislation, there were great
changes in the roles of DTCs in Hong Kong's financial
structure. The effects of the legislation will be the point
of discussion in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
DTCs' PERFORMANCE BEFORE AND AFTER THE LEGISLATION REFORMS
Before looking into the current performance of DTCs, it
would be relevant to look into the performance of the DTCs
before 1982 when the so-called DTC crisis happened.
4.1 Performance
1. No. of offices
Prior to the enactment of the Deposit-taking
Companies Ordinance in 1976, there were reports of
some two thousand finance companies in Hong Kong.
This figure was from an earlier estimate of one
thousand and five hundred, which itself was the
product of a crude system of classification of newly
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incorporated companies. (See Commissioner of Banking
1980). Another source of information showed that
there were only eight finance companies in 1967 and,
by the end of 1974, the number was only around 200
(See C W Cheng 1975). If both of these estimates
were close to reality, the increase in the number of
finance companies would be tremendous between
1974-1976. At the end of the transitional period in
1976 on the introduction of the Ordinance, however,
there were only one hundred and sixty five
registered DTCs. The high minimum prescibed capital
(HK$ 5 millions) had probably eliminated most of the
small scale finance companies from the business.
The number of DTCs had grown up to 348 at the end of
1981.
2. deposits
By looking at banks liabilities due to the DTCs, we
can get an idea of the relationship between the two
in the money market. Banks' liabilities to DTCs
increased from HK$ 6,929 million at the end of 1978
to HK$ 42,550 million at the end of 1981.
Yet during the same period, the growth of DTCs
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liabilities to banks grew only from HK$ 6,386
million to HK$ 30,732 million, thus making the banks
a net debtor and DTCs a net creditor. This net
transfer of funds was due mainly to demand and call
money or money at short notice. In 1979, the net
bank liabilities to DTCs were HK$ 8,566 million and,
at the same time, DTCs' net demand and call deposit
in the banks was HK$ 10,322 million. Similarly, in
1980, the first figure was 7,678 and the second one
was 8,886. There may have been two reasons behind
this. One of the reasons was that there was a large
influx of foreign banks in 1979. Between the easing
of the moratorium between 1978-1979 41 banks were
granted bank licenses. Those banks with a
relatively small deposit base to start with,
demanded many funds from the DTCs. Another reason
may be that banks bid for deposits through their
subsidiary DTCs since DTCs are not bounded by the
interest rate agreement. It was estimated by the
Financial Secretary in the meeting of the
Legislative Council on April 9, 1981 that 94 DTCs,
which had 75 of all DTC deposits, lent nearly 70%
of their deposit to their respective parent banks.
It is interesting to contrast this piece of
37
information with that provided by the then Assistant
Commissioner of Banking, Mr. Colin Martin in 1977.
Martin classified the 188 DTCs at that time into
eight categories (1). It can be seen that licensed
banks in Hong Kong control only 31, or 16.5% of the
DTCs. Whereas about 58 or 30.8% of the DTCs were
the branches, subsidiaries and associated companies
of foreign banks not licensed in Hong Kong. The top
six out of the top ten DTCs in asset value were from
this group. Apparently, foreign banks obtaining
their licenses after the moratorium was eased, still
found their subsidary DTCs useful especially in
getting around the interest rate agreement. Even
thougn DTCs are not allowed to accept retail
deposits, they are not bound by any agreement.
Therefore, they may offer competitive rates to
attract large institutional deposits. From table 1
and table 2, we can summarise that the growth of
doposits in DTCs were much faster than the growth in
other banks.
3. Loans and advances
The growth in loans and advances outside Hong Kong
is another striking aspect of the banking sector in
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the recent years. In late 1960's, nearly all loans
and advances were granted within Hong Kong. But by
then, offshore loans experienced a phenomenal rise
from HK$ 399 millions in 1970 to HK$ 33,583 millions
in 1981, a growth of 99 times. At the same time,
the share of offshore loans in total loans had also
increased from 4.1% at the end of 1970 to 20.8% at
the end of 1981. If we go one step further to see
where the loans went, we would find a large portion
was lent to the Asia-Pacific and African region,
64.14% and 20.94%, respectively, in 1980. (2)
On the liabilities side,- the' mount due to banks
abroad had also increased tremendously. In the
years before 1972, the amount deposited in Hong Kong
by overseas banks was relatively little. The stock
market boom in 1972 and 1973 had attracted much
inflow of capital. Since then, the net balance of
Hong Kong against overseas banks had become
negative, reflecting a net capital inflow from
overseas banks. This net balance had increased from
HK$ 43,887 million at the end of 1970 to HK$ 342952
million at the end of 1981, an increase of more than
nine fold. The share of the amount due to banks
abroad in total liabilities had also increased from
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11% to 45.9% in the same period. These changes in
the balance sheet items reflected Hong Kong's
development into a regional financial centre. There
was a persistent increase in the amount lent abroad,
especially in the Asia-Pacific region. Implicit in
the statistics is the fact that large international
banks had been borrowing heavily from their head
offices and other resources to finance lendings
emanating from Hong Kong.
The same trend of development can be observed in the
statistics for DTCs. Loans and advances abroad
increased from HK$ 21,165 million to HK$ 48)036
million in the period of 1978-1981. This was more
than double in four years' time. At the same time,
net balances due to banks abroad had also doubled
from HK$ 18,455 millions at the end of 1978 to HK$
3 9, 17 9 millions at the end of 1981.
When we analyse the loans and advances of the DTCs
(See table 3), one of the main difference between
the credit porfolio of a licensed bank and a DTC was
certainly in their preference for the duration of
the loans. To start out with, foreign' trade
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financing occupies a less important share in the
portfolio of the DTCs. Its relative share is only
16.8% in 1978 and 15.6% in 1980, in comparison with
29.4% and 26.4% of the licensed banks in the same
year.
At first sight of the statistics in 1978 and 1979,
one is astonished by the extremely high proportion
of credit occupied by the transport and equipment.
Its relative share had fallen rapidly to 10.4% in
June 1981. The reason for this was that a
seven-year loan of US$400 million was granted to the
Mass Railway Corporation of Hong Kong in the early
seventies. The loans were arranged by a consortium
led by the Maunfacturers Hanover Trust Co., which
was the leading DTC at that time. This showed the
activities of the large scale DTCs in syndicating
loans. Furthermore, it indicated that the loans
granted by the DTCs were not limited to short-term
ones. Similar to the portfolios of the licensed
banks, however, was the increasing share of credit
for the building and construction sector and for
professional and private individuals, reflecting the
involvement of the DTCs in the area of hire
purchase, mortgage and stock market finance. The
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amount of credit extended by the DTCs had expanded
from HK$ 31,135 million at the end of 1978 to HK$
957.42 million at the end of 1981, an increase of
206.7% in four years.
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4.2 The DTC Crisis in 1982-1983 and the Reasons for it
In November 1982, three DTCs: Axona International
Holdings, Tetra Finance, and Dollar Credit and
Financing ran into severe liquidity problems.
Executives with Axona felt that their problem was
mainly one of timing, which could have been resolved
with a margin more patience. The closure of three out
of Hong Kong's 361 DTCs was hardly dramatic news.
Indeed, the wonder was that many more had not been
forced to shut their doors much earlier. Actually, no
less than eight DTCs were suspended or put in various
stages of liquidation. (C)
In 1979-1981, Hong Kong experienced excess credit
creation, which was the major source of the boom in the
property market and the boom on the stock exchanges,
but, since 1981, this has been followed by a sharp
contraction in the rate of growth of money and credit,
leading to a fall in property values, a crash on the
stock market, and serious liquidity problems for many
DTCs, which had helped to finance the boom.
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The timing of the crisis was concurrent with the
beginning of the talk on Hong Kong's future. The
British Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, visited
Beijing in September 1982. Thus, some people blamed
the cause of the crisis as the uncertain political
future. However, in the writers' opinion, it was the
boom and bust cycle in money and credit that was at the
root of the DTC crisis in Hong Kong. The crisis would
probably have occurred for economic reasons alone, even
without the added uncertainty injected by the political
negotiation in Beijing over Hong Kong's future.
Therefore, it is worthwhile to analyse the economic and
administrative causes behind the crisis, regardless of
the political environment.
1. Legislation.
Hong Kong is famous for its laissez faire system.
However, this system has also caused a great amount
of trouble. Although Hong Kong government did
impose some new regulations, (4) they were criticized
to be fire fighting only. This type of reactionary
legislation, in some authors' opinion, (5) had
inevitably produced a some what curious and
makeshift banking structure. The peculiarities of
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the Hong Kong system resulted in a system that
positively allows monetary instability because the
authorities are virtually powerless to affect the
rate of monetary growth, while the banks are not
restrained by any external constraint on the rate of
credit and money creation. Consequently, they are
free to alternate between phases of exuberant credit
expansion and extreme cautiousness and timidity.
This results in wide swings in money and credit
growth.
2. Monetary policy
After the DTC crisis, the most Usual.-.ry went up for
more supervision, tighter control over bank lending
to the property sector or to individual borrowers,
tougher disclosure requirements, more vigorous
scrutiny of the ownership of public companies, and
more exacting standards for the registration of
DTCs.
However, the problem may well be in the underlying
theoretical issue, i.e., there was fundamental
instability in the monetary system as a whole. For
as long as money and credit growth alternates
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between phases of dangerously rapid expansion and
phases of abrupt curtailment or contraction, bankers
and businessmen will inevitably make greater
mistakes and get caught in a more severe financial
squeeze than they would otherwise have done under a
system that promised more stable money and credit
conditions throughout the cycle.
It is true that there have been abuses associated
with the recent boom and bust cycle, but reforms
aimed only at increasing supervision without
improving the underlying processes that determine
the growth of money and credit do not tackle the
root cause of monetary instability, namely the
ability of banks and DTCs in Hong Kong to create (or
not to create) credit more or less at their own
discretion.
The series of revisions to the Banking and DTC
Ordinances of 1978-1980 did nothing to regulate the
growth of money and credit on any sound basis. Far
from making changes at a fundamental level, the new
legislation simply imposed an artificial three-tier
departmentalization of financial institutions by
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size and maturity of deposit. This was itself
discriminatory and, by its timetable of
implementation, accentuated the financial crisis
among the DTCs. The new ordinances also brought
into being a statutory cartel-the Hong Kong
Association of Banks, which enshrined interest rates
as the key regulatory mechanism for controlling
credit and money creation. However, with the poor
performance and the wide fluctuations in money and
credit growth, this approach has been questioned.
3. Inadequacy of the supervision instrument.
Some people suggested that the Hong Kong government
did imposed regulation to curtail the overextension
of credit. They asked the finance companies to
maintain a minimum liquidity ratio of 25%. However,
the problem with liquid assets as a device for
monetary control is that usually those assets
defined as liquid assets do not correspond to the
liabilities of the monetary authority. Therefore,
the monetary authority cannot control the changes
and supply of liquid assets. Thus, so long as the
banks and DTCs can manufacture liquid assets to
match any local requirements, there is likely to be
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very little effective restraint from this source on
their willingness to create credit.
4. The squeeze by the banks
The legislation was seen at the time to be unduly
restrictive on the registered DTCs, but the squeeze
on the DTCs by the banks was not foreseen.
Few banks deny the bank's right to press hard for
repayment. In fact, most experienced bankers could
not believe that American Express, with whom Axona
had maintained banking ties for many years, acted
precipitately. It was seen more likely that drastic
action was taken as a very last resort.
Nevertheless, it was suggested to have been American
Express Bank's action that started a chain reaction
amongst foreign bankers.
The result was that even well managed DTCs were put
under pressure. Dollar Credit, for long, was
regarded as a well-managed DTC, and there was even
speculation that it would be granted a banking
license.
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Moreover, it had been suggested that the crisis
stemed from the absence of a lender of last resort,
while Dollar Credit and other failed DTCs may have
had their own problems. The reaction of the banks in
cutting lines indiscriminately, without considering
the system wide repercussions, contributed
significantly to the ensuing instability. Since
DTCs relied greatly upon the interbank money market,
the problem of funding would be very great if they
did not have a strong parent bank support.
4.3 Immediate Effects after the Crisis
By looking into the figures of M2 and M3 (See table 1
2). It can be discovered that M2 grew, faster than M3,
proving a phenomenal shift of customer deposits from
DTCs to bankers. This shift can be explained by:-
Firstly, deposits of over HK$ 500,000 were free from
the interest rate cartel, thus triggering stiff
competition between banks and DTCs. In that
situation, the inherent instinct of customers will
favor banks in preference to upstart DTCs, not owned
by parent banks whether here or abroad.
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Secondly, the statutory 50% rundown of short-term
deposits with registered DTCs, forced them to turn
increasingly to the money markets for their
short-term funding needs. This is one solid reason
that persuaded the authorities that DTCs would face
a squeeze but could tide it over because of early
notice.
Thirdly, money market rates anticipate actual
reduction in interest rates, and thus, in the short
run, bank deposits tended to be more attractive than
DTC rates.
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NOTES ON CHAPTER 4
1. MARTIN 1977
2. HO, 1982
3. Hong Kong's Financial Crisis, ASIAN MONETARY
MONITOR 12/1982
4. Examples are:
The 1964 Banking Ordinance was brought in as a direct
response to the 1961 banking crisis
The interest rate agreement was introduced in 1966 in
the aftermath of the 1965 banking crisis
The office of Commissioner for securities, the
Securities Ordinance and the Protection of Investors
Ordinance were all introduced in 1974 in response to the
stock market boom and crash of 1972--1974
The DTC Ordinances from 1976 onwards were brought in to
regulate a part of the financial sector that was going
at such a pace that it posed a direct threat to the
licensed banks and their interest rate agreement
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a three-tier banking system had been brought into being
with the specific aim of protecting the licensed Banks'
interest rate agreement, which was rapidly being eroded
by the competitive, free market interest rates offered
by the DTCs for deposits in excess of HK$ 50,000
5. ASIAS MONETARY MONITOR, op.cit
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CHAPTER 5
THE ROLE OF DTCs IN THE FUTURE
As is mentioned in the previous chapters, the extensive
revision of the Banking Ordinance and Deposit-taking
Companies Ordinance in 1981 brought forth the 'three-tier
system,' which had massive effects on the operations of the
financial institutions. The financial sector is demarcated
in such a way that DTCs had their competitive edges over
licensed banks significantly blunted. Whether or not the
specific aim of the amendment was to protect the banks'
interest rate agreement, which it was said, wa:- bei-
rapidly eroded by the competitive, free market interest
rates offered by the DTCs for deposits in excess of $50,0001
academics' views are that the tightened regulatory
restraints sieved the mismanaged and financially weak DTCs
and made the future financial system of Hong Kong healthier.
5. 1
By-Products of the 1982 Amendment: A Dormant Group of DTCs
While it is still too early to rule that the
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amendments have effectively plugged the previous
legislative loopholes of the ordinances that many DTCs
used to cash in on, and have, hence, restored people's
confidence in Hong Kong as a sound and efficient
international financial centre, the more imn3ediate
aftermath was the DTC crisis of 1982, which lasted
into 1983. Registered DTCs, which represent the
lowest tier, were the hardest hit. They are no longer
permitted to take or hold any deposits with an
original term to maturity of less than three months.
This, in turn, greatly erodes their competitiveness in
attracting short-term deposits. This represents a
substantial portion of their source of funds because
both individual and corporate de-ositors do not like
to tie their money up for over three months in times
of trade fluctuations and political instability.
We do not want to jump to the conclusion that the
drain of short-term deposits will automatically
paralyse the activities of some of the registered
DTCs. One alternative way is to borrow from the
interbank market. Some DTCs virtually draw as much as
90 to 95 per cent of their funding from this source.
But, in times of credit contraction or when bankers
remain in extreme cautiousness and timidity in
granting credit lines due to previous unhappy
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experience, as is at present when some banks haven't
yet recovered from the shocks generated from the
debacles of some 'well-known' companies such as the
Carrian group, smaller DTCs whose credit rating is
comparatively low either have to borrow from the
interbank market at a higher cost to support their
lending activities or simply have to remain dormant.
Though there are no available statistics on the number
of dormant DTCs, a DTC operator is quoted as saying
that non-bank affiliated and weak equity based DTCs
are virtually stranded, and their chance of survival
both in the present and future market is slim. To
combat the adverse situation, these DTCs can, of
course, diversify their activities and shift their
emphasis from interest-earning lending activities to
fee income, e. g. advisory service on mergers and
acquisitions, bonds/ shares underwriting, issue of
bills and letters of credit, etc. But one problem is
that their images are not comparable to those of
larger DTCs and licensed bark s, who have
long-established expertise and a reputation to support
their involvement in the more sophisticated
retail/merchant banking activities. One example is,
LCs that are issued by small DTCs can in no way
compete with those issued by big banks. It is,
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therefore, only natural that customers are more prone
to entrust banks and large DTCs with the tasks to
carry out big transactions. Taking the words of this
DTC operator, we guesstimate that 35% of the
registered DTCs are dormant and will be excluded from
this part of discussion.
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5.2 Source of Funds
As of June 30, 1983, the number of licensed DTCs and
registered DTCs are 29 and 319, respectively. They
are survivors of the 1981-1982 financial turbulence
and are now keenly competing with each other to reap
profits from the tight market, which is quite stagnant
at this moment due to worldwide recession and
uncertain political future of Hong Kong. As we have
mentioned above, the exact percentage of dormant DTCs
can only be guesstimated. We have, therefore,
categorised the remaining DTCs along the line of their
legal status (whether they are licensed or
registered), their scale of operation, nature of
business (whether their prime concern is consumer
financing or corporate financing or both) and their
ownership.
A few words have to be added at this juncture about
the ownership of DTCs. It has always been a thorny
area to explore and virtually denies certain
identification. The 'vulnerability' of regulations to
manipulation is clearly demonstrated in the Carrian
Group case. Rules that make revelation of company
ownership mandatory can always be gone around. Hence,
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we can only draw rough dividing lines to segregate the
DTCs as follows: 27% are wholly-owned subsidiaries of
local/foreign banks, 22% are captive investment house
of non-financial corporations, and 51% are
consortium-owned.
To take a closer look at the present dynamic scenario
of the DTC industry and get a feel of how the future
trend may go, we had conducted a series of personal
interviews with the head people of some DTCs that can
best represent other DTCs of the same category. In
the course of interviews, none of the interviewees
felt great anxiety about the funding problem. We were
told that they can either get direct financial support
from their parent banks (in case of bank affiliated
DTCs) who have a broad service network, as well as the
legal right to receive from the general public money
on current, deposit, savings or other similar accounts
repayable on demand or within three months or on call
or notice of less than three months. Or due to their
close relationships with the reputed banks or
corporations or consortia, these DTCs are given a
higher credit rating, which enables them to borrow
from the interbank market at favourable rates and with
greater ease.
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Apart from some conglomerate-owned DTCs that, through
group connections, can easily solicit corporate
deposits, the DTCs' own investment service of unit
trusts and pension fund can also be another reliable
source of funds. These pools of money are not subject
to the control of an individual and, for those DTCs
that have proved their competence and expertise in
managing them in consecutive years, the unit trusts
and provident funds represent a cheap and reasonably
'unfailing' reservoir of funds.
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5.3 The New Pattern of Operations
1. Prudent lending to quality borrowers
In the decade of expansion-the seventies-which was
punctuated by recession only in 1975 and 1976, and
in 1980 and 1981 when the booming atmosphere in
Hong Kong was further fuelled by the real estate
craze, the funds of the DTCs were primarily used
to support their aggressive lending activities,
which included term loans, project/trade
financing, and individual/corporate financing,
etc. Then, in 1982, the effects of the world
recession began to show and growth in Hong Kong
exports declined from 13 per cent a year to minus
two per cent. The property prices also began to
collapse that autumn, when talks in Beijing began,
coincidentally.
The substantial fall in property prices could have
been explained in terms of basic economic
fundamentals. The boom is bound to bust, as it
has done in so many other places in the world when
there is over-supply and when highly inflated
prices outrun the market. But it would not have
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dealt such a heavy blow to the financial sector
had the confidence of investors at large not been
further undermined by the new element-the
realisation that 1997 was only just 15 years away.
An ever increasing number of decisions, both
business and personal, took this fact into account
and, at one moment, the territory was in a state
of political nervousness. Many development and
expansion plans were frozen, and investors are
generally taking a wait-and-see attitude before
the 'overcast' political future of Hong Kong
clears up.
The combined effect is a shrinkage of lending
outlets. On the other hand, having learnt the
'expensive' lessons, both banks and DTCs deeply
felt the need to revise their policies. They are
more cautious and risk aversive. This is
reflected in their choice of quality borrowers and
investment of funds in tradable assets, such as
commercial papers, Certificate of Deposits and
even overseas issues that come into Hong Kong.
The aim is to cushion the companies against loan
loss, which may lead to disastrous results.
One of the interviewees told the writers that DTCs
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(and banks alike) would turn down applications for
credit lines filed by companies (including those
DTCs that have a weak depositor base and rely to a
great extent for their source of funds on the
interbank market) that do not have reputed
ownership and a good record of business
operations.
2. Active pursuit of new financial instruments and
sophistication of services.
This shift of emphasis from aggressive,
indiscriminate granting of credit to customers in
rder to cash in on one particular mushrooming
industry (the real estate boom, in the case of
1980 and 1981) and to the extreme that even the
natural law of the market is ignored, to more
cautious selection of quality customers is coupled
with a will to diversify and upgrade their
businesses and services.
The general development indicates increased
sophistication and resilience of the DTC industry.
The simple mechanism- taking in deposits at
competitive free market interest rates and lending
them on a percentage gain, depends on the credit
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worthiness of customers and the risk involved-
which many DTCs had originally started with, has
been greatly refined. Examples are, some DTCs,
which were originally founded as 'a captive
investment house' of a bank to go around the
interest rate agreement, are now operated
primarily as a profit centre. Some of them even
have their own independent customer base. Their
functions are significant in their own right-
they may specialise in one particular aspect of
the finance field, e.g. arrangement of syndicated
loans, issues underwriting, consumer financing and
advisory service on financial matters, such as
mergers and acquisitions, raising of funds, etc.,
Unlike most licensed banks, which are active in
recruiting and training inexperienced fresh
graduates, DTCs like to employ experienced people
having a proven performance record in the finance
field. These people are well-equipped to be put
immediately in the front line to fight the fierce
battle. This means to develop the DTCs beyond the
scope that their name literally implies. They are
engaging in more varied and sophisticated
financial activities and are heading towards
professionalism.
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All these signify the growing complexity and
flexibility of the industry. It can be envisaged
that fewer and fewer DTCs will continue to operate
in accordance with the simple and traditional
'formula.' Those persons interviewed had
unanimously mentioned the word 'innovativeness'
when asked about the crucial quality a DTC should
have in order to survive and thrive in the future
market. There is no simple, absolute way of
success. The operators have to be perceptive
(about any possible opportunities in the
everchanging financial market), adaptative and
responsive.
More sophisticated methods to guard the company
against interest rate fluctuations are thought
out. The vulnerable situation of borrowing short
and lending long in the past is not left untendec
Matching of assets and liabilities is given
greater emphasis, and, in times of shrinking
lending outlets and overflowing funds, some DTCs
may choose not to take in deposits but to borrow
from the money market, as the need arises. This




A final point is to be added at this juncture to
the future trend of DTC industry. While it is
always necessary that DTCs operators must be
innovative so as to exploit new financial
instruments with which, for example, cheaper funds
can be raised for the clients or greater returns
be obtained for investors' money, and so as to
better their existing services, specialisation is
the kert to final victory. This is one way to
secure customer loyalty and to survive in the
industry. DTCs have to develop the kind of
expertise and efficiency that is typical f a
specialist to impress their clients, who may be
professional finance people themselves.
There may be basically two main streams: wholesale
banking and consumer financing. Larger DTCs have
both the manpower and capital to engage in more
sophisticated and technically demanding jobs, such
as underwriting of new issues, money and foreign
exchange brokerage, financial advisory set-vices,
loan syndication for big projects, etc. And those
with relatively small capital and expertise can
serve clients in areas such as equipment leasing,
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personal loans, mortgages, taxi financing, etc.,
which are often excluded by the larger DTCs from
their business scope.
Some banks have both wholly-owned licensed and
registered DTCs that share out the work of
merchant banking (mainly to deal with big
corporations and high net worth individuals) and
consumer financing (here target markets range from
small-medium size companies to customers with
smaller requirements). So it may not be fair to
generalise that all DTCs are involved in
deposits/loan of comparatively small denominations
or have operations that are simpler and of smaller
capital. Put in a more appropriate way, the
'division of labour' is not necessarily based
strictly on the capital strength of the individual
DTC, but on the concept that clients of different
needs can be better served by 'experts' who
specialize in respective financial fields.
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5.4 Future Development
As this trend continues, non-bank affiliated DTCs that
rely for their funding solely on `small' (in terms of
amounts and categories) depositors and are involved
primarily in lending money at higher interest rates to
less credit worthy clients will be phased out. These
operators can, of course, diversify their businesses
or think out more complicated and innovative products
and services. But the reality is, when the source of
funds is limited and exhaustible, and when market
rating of registered and non-bank affiliated DTCs is
low, chances of survival for companies of this
category are dim.
1. Bank--affiliated DTCs gaining new identity
As for bank-affiliated DTCs, they may at this
moment lose their favour as their parent banks'
deposit-taking arms and vehicles with which the
banks bypass the interest rate agreement. This is
because, since the DTCs Ordinance has been amended
in 1981, the competitiveness of DTCs in attracting
small denomination deposits has been greatly
eroded. The aftermath of recent crushing failures
67
of some 'well-known' financial institutions also
leads to the fact that -aun.y depositors prefer
safety to higher interest return. Funds move the
other way round from DTCs back to the big,
reliable banks because the former are subject to
'minimum maturity' restriction.
However, a banker whom one of the writers
interviewed is quoted as saying that the existence
of banks' DTC arms (whether registered or
licensed) is justified as long as there are
differences maintained between the status of banks
and that of deposit-taking companies.
Bank-affiliated DTCs will not:-.be c( )sed down for
two reasons. First, they can absorb the shocks
generated by future changes in the market or by
government policies and second, they are virtually
developing in their own way into more 'precise'
(in terms of structure) and 'sophisticated'
financial units that offer specialised services to
more well-defined client groups.
2. International extension
Accompanying this development is international
extension of DTCs. By 'horizontal' expansion,
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DTCs are closer to the decision-making core of
their overseas clients and in a better position to
obtain first hand information about international
financial situations and exploit new financial
instruments being used in the overseas money
market. It is also a natural outgrowth to meet
the needs of local clients who like to go
international and have their business/investment
activities transcend geographical boundaries.
3. Excavation of new financial products/services
In the coming years, it is therefore expected that
DTCs will aim not only at providing professional
and efficient financial services for both
individual./institutional clients, but also at
scouting for new financial instruments so that
they can be further developed into a sort of
financial supermarket where customers who come to
them can freely choose from a wide variety of
'goods' It is known that Shearson and Citicorp
are developing along this line.
4. Division of labor between Banks and DTCs
While the more mechanical and routine tasks are
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left to be more effectively dealt with by the
banks, whose operations are largely computerised
and effective for handling standardised
procedures, DTCs are in a better position both
structurally and technically to respond to the
specific needs of clients and to give them
tailor-made services. The comparatively small and
simple organisational structure of DTCs saves them
from the red tape that is typical of big banks and
reduces document flows to a minimum. This, in
turn, enhances the efficiency and effectiveness of
DTCs as a distinct group of financial
institutions.
As is mentioned above, the transformation of DTCs
is conducive to the development of Hong Kong into
a more sound and well-reputed international
financial centre. Financially weak and
speculative DTCs, which aim only at taking
advantage of a particular opportune moment and
making quick money, are eliminated from business.
The division of labour between banks and DTCs,
according to their organisational and technical
strengths, will reduce conflicts between the two
parties on one hand and upgrade Hong Kong's image
as a place where efficient and professional
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financial experts converge on the other.
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5.5 Government Supervision
The banking legislations in Hong Kong is often
described as 'reactionary' because it has usually been
introduced only in the aftermath of some crisis. For
example, the DTCs Ordinances from 1976 onwards were
brought in to regulate a part of the financial sector
that was growing at such a pace that it posed a direct
threat to the licensed banks. More recently, the
three-tier system has been brought into being with the
specific aim of protecting the interest rate
agreement, which was eroded by the free market
interest rates offered by the DTCs. Despite the
government's belief that legislation is a panacea to
rectify mistakes or monitor malpractices, the failure
of Carrian Group is an embarassing demonstration of
both the laxity of legislation (a variant of
government supervision) and the cleverness of
businessmen to go around laws and regulations.
This implies, therefore, that whenever there is a new
regulation, there are thousands of new ways to bypass
the legislative obstacle. Cosmetic actions that can
be maneuvered to take advantage of loopholes are
numerous and inexhaustible. Hence, prime
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consideration for future prudential supervision should
be to make sure that
1) consumers' interests are protected
2) the present free market mechanism is not unduly
interferred and nullified because competition
promotes of f icieny.
A possible reform in the future is setting up a
deposit-insurance scheme. This leaves the market
force intact on one hand and assures the soundness of
the system on the other. Government can require all
DTCs (and banks alike) to buy into a deposit insurance
scheme organised by the government. The amount of
premium they must pay is tied to the degree of risk of
the companies' assets. Under such a scheme, the
depositors can get back a certain portion of their
deposit if the DTC suddenly closes down. This is of
paramount importance as is agreed by people in the DTC
industry that. protection of depositors' interest





Competition in the financial sector will be getting keener
in the future. In order to survive and enjoy reasonable
profit in such a turbulent and dynamic environment, both the
banks and DTCs will have to 'excavate' and provide more
financial instruments and services. The quality of service
will move towards a higher standard, and the trend of moving
to more sophisticated operation, which requires great
technological improvement, will call for larger human and
capital investment. The profit margin of DTCs may be narrow
in the short run, but a fair return is ensured in the long
run because their position in the financial sector will be
strengthened and their reputation reinforced.
The DTCs will also strive to build flexibility into their
operations in order to accommodate both economic boom and
bust and the political uncertainty that is currently facing
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their operations in order to accommodate both economic
boom and bust and the political uncertainty that is
currently facing everybody in Hong Kong. In sum, the
previous 'catastrophic' events in the financial sector
helped sieve the weak and test the strength and
perseverance of the strong. In the future, DTCs that
are well run and have groped their way through the
dark passage for a clear direction, be they small or
large, will survive compatibly to serve the needs of
the overall economy and contribute significantly to
the growth of Hong Kong as a reputed financial centre.
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APPENDIX
QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE INTERVI EVJS.
The funding side:
What is the proportion from the inter-bank market?
What is the proportion from the depositor?
What kind of problems may occur?
Do you find the HIBOR an equitable indicator?
Do you feel that there should be a central bank?
Are you satiafied with the quasi-central bank role
played by the Hong Kong Bank?
Do you have a well planned strategy to fund your
operation?
Parent Bank-DTC relation:
What degree of independence do you get from the parent
Bank?
Do you treat yourself as a merchant bank arm of the Bank
or a separate corporation?
Do you find a big difference between bank owned DTCs and
non-bank owned DTCs?
Do you feel any pressure from the parent bank?
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How many directors of the DTCs were from the bank?
How do you compete with the parent bank?
Lending activities:
Which sector do you specialise in?
What kind of advantages do you get in compared with
the bank?
What kind of sector do you prefer to lend to?
What sectors are most profitable to do business with?
Legislation:
Do you think that the three-tier system was a good device
for control?
Do you feel that the three-tier system is a correct
way to distinguish the DTCs?
Do you feel that the registered DTCs were in an inferior
position to compete?
What kind of long term results do you expected from
the introduction of the three-tier system?
Fianlly, what is your general comment about the whole
financial industry in Hong Kong? Do you see any positive
hint that the DTC will complement the whole industry?
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TABLE 1
MONEY SUPPLY IN THE YEAR 1980-1983










Year Licensed DTCs Registered DTCs All DTCs Total(Plus Bank)
1980 NA 42,101 42,101 X28,854
1981 NA 59,167 59,167 163625
1982 9, 730 34, 083 43,813 234, 072




ANALYSIS OF DTCs LOAN & ADVANCES (Millions)
As at last day







59520 330 25937& telephone
5. Building and
5 143 13,344 9,9262,586construction 8,801
6. Wholesale &
2,645 3,0995,8942,334 5,004retail trade









58 387 382 513 575
987 1,289 2,388 3,183 3,244
153 269 807 289 157
2,283 8,391 11,164 17,403 15,862
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